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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\

RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and

~.

\

Appellant~
1

vs.

Case No.
10251

TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E.
WEST,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for dissolution and winding up
of a partnership, and distribution of its assets. Following a prior appeal the case was remanded and the trial
court directed to make findings with respect to the
actual intent of the partners when they executed two
ambiguous documents: Articles of Partnership (Exhibit I) and a Dissolution Agreement (Exhibit 2).
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial without a jury the court ordered that
the books of the partners be adjusted to provide, among
other things, that the amounts plaintiff advanced to the
partnership subsequent to December 8, 1958 ($29,645.39 of approximately $150,000.00 paid in by him)
should be repaid with interest; but that the balance
subject to minor adjustments, be distributed 40% to'
plaintiff, 407o to defendant Terry R. West, and 20%
to defendant Flora E. West.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial
court and remand of the case to· the District Court of
Salt Lake County for entry of a decree directing the
court-appointed receiver to pay to the plaintiff the
sums provided in the judgment of the court dated February 27, 1963; to return to the plaintiff, subject to
the minor adjustments agreed to by plaintiff, all sums
paid into the partnership, with interest, to the extent
that assets are available; and to divide the surplus, if
any, on the basis of 407o to plaintiff, 407o to defendant
Terry R. West and 207o to defendant Flora E. West.
The desired form of decree is set out in Paragraph 12
of plaintiff's motion to amend (R. 75-79}.
In the alternative, the plaintiff asks that the case
be remanded for a new trial.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is the second appeal. The District Court
originally had entered a summary judgment to the
effect that all partnership capital and assets remaining
after payment of non-partner creditors, were to be distributed 40<fo to plaintiff, 40lJo to defendant Terry R.
West, and 20<fo to defendant Flora E. West. Appeal
of that judgment was before this court as Case No.
9870 and is reported as West v. West_, et al._, 15 Utah
2d 87, 387 P .2d 686 ( 1964) . This court reversed, and
remanded the case for trial, directing the court to "take
evidence and make findings of fact as to what the intent
of the parties was in executing" the Articles of Partnership and a subsequent dissolution agreement. In its
opinion this court pointed out that it would be proper
to "consider the background and circumstances, including the relationship of the parties, the purpose for which
the various documents were made, and principles of
equity and justice relating thereto."
A trial was held, and the parties offered testimony
and exhibits relating to the circumstances leading up
to the execution of tlie partnership articles, subsequent
conduct of the parties, and negotiations and transactions
aimed at dissolution of the partnership. Produced as
witnesses were Rulon R. West; Paul S. Roberts, the
attorney who drew the partnership articles; defendant
Terry R. West; two daughters of Rulon R. West and
Flora E. West; two accountants, Kenneth A. Elwood
and Paul D. Tanner; and a former attorney of Terry
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R. West, E. L. Schoenhals. Portions of the depositions
of Flora E. West, and another West daughter, Ruth
Francis, were heard.
The trial court entered a "Minute Entry of Decision" dated April21, 1964 (R. 59-60), which set forth
the "meaning" of the articles of partnership of October
15, 1957 (Exhibit I) ; in it the trial court found that
adjustment should be made to the books because of net
profits and losses in various years; that the contributions made by Rulon R. West after December 3, 1958,
were not contributed for "capital credit", and that they,
like salary items, unpaid at the time due to Terry R.
West and contributions of Flora E. West should have
been kept separate, credited to a special account payable, and returned to the respective partners with interest. Substantially all of the remaining assets were
to be distributed 40<fo to Rulon R. West, 407o to Terry
R. West and 20<fo to Flora E. West. Thereafter findings of fact and conclusions of law were prepared by
defendants' counsel and were signed by the court.
In this appeal the plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the findings of fact, contending that they are
manifestly erroneous. Because of the nexus between
the testimony and findings, summaries of relevant
testimony and exhibits will be set out in the argument,
particularly that part challenging the validity of the
findings of fact. Other facts are set out in this court's
prior opinion.
4
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ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AS
TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
IN THE AR'fiCLES OF PARTNERSHIP AND
DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT WERE MANI:FESTLY ERRONEOUS.
The findings of fact (R. 64-72) are difficult to
analyze, because the court failed to find with respect
to "actual intent," because the findings are repugnant
to the Minute Entry of Decision, because they were
drawn to take advantage of every conceivable theory
supporting defendants' myriad positions, and because
the findings apparently were drawn with one eye toward
a future dispute with state and federal taxing authorities. They did little more than restate the defendants'
contentions as to the "meaning" of the Articles of
Partnership. Finding No. 2 (R. 65), for example, is
that the "intent of the parties in said Articles of Partnership was that the initial contributions made by the
plaintiff would be contributions to capital," which intent
"was expressed in the Articles of Partnership in paragraph3(a)." The effect of such a finding is to ignore
the parties' actual intentions and overrule the prior
decision of this court that the articles are ambiguous.
This objection is more than technical; upon the
evidence presented, the only reasonable finding that
could have been made with respect to "intention" was
5
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either ( 1) that Rulon intended to have his capital contributions returned to him and the other parties knew
this or should have known it; or (2) all parties so intended, or (3) the evidence fails to establish actual
intention of one or more of the parties.
The following summary of trial evidence demonstrates that the findings of intent are not supported by
sufficient evidence and are manifestly erroneous.

Paul 8. Roberts
Mr .. Paul S. Roberts, the lawyer who drew the
original Articles of Partnership in 1957, had represented the. sellers in their' sale of the motel property,
and met Rulon while assisting in the transaction. Rulon
asked Mr. Roberts to prepare Articles of Partnership,
telling him that he. (Rulon) ought to have 57o interest
on the money he put in the partnership, "about what
he could get if he invested it someplace else" (R. 94).
When Mr. Roberts inquired as to the "interests" of the
partners, they agreed to make it 407o for Rulon, 407o
for Terry, and 207o for Flora, but the discussion was
in general terms. Return of capital was not discussed
(R. 94-95). Mr. Roberts met with Rulon on only two
or three occasions, and there was never a discussion
with him about return of capital, the meaning of gross
profits, or about any "gift."
Contract provisions for dissolution and distribution
of assets were taken from other agreements and form
6
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books, had not been discussed with Rulon, and were
put in the agreement by Mr. Roberts (R. 98). He was
not instructed to make distribution in any other proportion; and he drew the agreement to provide that the
distribution would be made in the same proportion as
the profits would be distributed, since he regarded this
as usual practice (R. 99) . He did not discuss paragraph
12 with Rulon West (R. 99), and the material in that
paragraph came from his standard contracts (R. 100).
He didn't read the clauses to Mr. West and he didn't
talk to him about the phrase "including loss of capital"
in paragraph 6 (R. 100). At the time of preparation
of the agreement the drawing account was discussed
between Rulon and Terry (R. 103), and it was agreed
that the drawing account was to be $500.00 per month
"provided that there was enough profits to pay that"
(R. 104). He did not discuss with Rulon the provisions
in paragraph 15 relating to dissolution and distribution of assets. All he did was draw the contract and
submit it to the partners.

Rulon R. West
In October 1957 Rulon and Flora, his wife, were
going on a trip. At that time Rulon was purchasing
the motel property with the idea of going into a partnership with Terry and he suggested that a written partnership agreement be drawn up (R. 148). Rulon told
Terry they would share 50-50 (R. 150), Rulon would
get 5<fo on his money as interest, his capital would be
repaid, and Terry's equity in the partnership would
7
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have to come out of the profits. Terry asked that I~,lora
be brought into the partnership (R. 151).
Rulon told Mr. Roberts that 5ro would have to be
paid to him on his money, and that Terry would be
permitted to buy an interest in the partnership with
return to profits (R. 152). Rulon left for Hawaii
shortly after execution of the partnership agreement,
and while he was in Hawaii Terry made his first request
for additional money. Rulon did not send him money
but gave him some immediately upon his return (R.
153) .. At this time repayment of the money was not
discussed (R. 154). Later at the trailer court Rulon
requested payment of some interest (R. 155).
On December 3, 1958, Rulon wrote a letter to Terry
(Exhibit 9) enclosing for signature 27 promissory notes
for the checks theretofore made out in behalf of the
p~rtnership, totaling $124,823.43 (R. 156). On December 10, 1959, Rulon wrote a second letter to Terry
asking for execution of notes ( R. 157, Exhibit 10).
Throughout, Rulon believed that the money advanced to the partnership belonged to him, and that
Terry and Flora would get their interest from profits
(R. 161-162) .· He was expecting 57o interest on his
money. He and Terry had agreed upon this and he told
Mr. Roberts to put it in the agreement. He didn't know
whether to call the money he paid in "investment,"
"contribution," or "loan" (R. 163). He didn't know
how the amounts were credited (R. 168).

8
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Terry R. West
About three years prior to the execution of the
partnership agreement Rulon West had indicated interest in owning a motel (R. 106}. About a year before
execution of the Articles, Rulon had had a nervous
breakdown (R. 113). Before execution of the partnership agreement there had been a meeting between Rulon
and Terry, alone, at a Chinese cafe in Murray. Rulon
said that any further sums he contributed would be
credited to Rulon's capital account, and Terry was
agreeable to this because "it was his money anyway"
(R. 110). In his initial testimony, Terry had difficulty
in answering whether repayment of capital was discussed, but finally said it had been, and that Rulon said
in terms, that "the capital I put in will not need to
be repaid" (R. 111). But his subsequent testimony
shows this is be little more than an audacious conclusion
from statements that were non-specific.
"He told me of course, that he was getting 65
years old; that he was considerably - conservatively figured - worth half a million dollars,
and that he and his attorneys - he didn't say
who -he and his attorneys had had - discussed
his other plan, and that he would like to have, in
the partnership agreement, a statement that
where, upon his death, that, automatically, I
would be distributed part of his capital; and I
told him, 'I wasn't so worried about what would
happen upon your death as how worried I am as,
after I changed my future plans in accounting
and engineering, if I come out here, and, for
one reason or another, this thing is a flop.' He
9
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says, 'This is no problem because we can have
another arrangement in t.he pa~tnership agreement, whereby, upon a dissolution, you will be
protected there, too.'
"Q. Is that the extent of his undertaking at
that time?

:'A. I wouldn~t say it was word for word, but
thzs was about what was said between myself and
my father_, yes.
"Q. That is what you rely on that as separate
oral · understanding as the basis for the transfer
on the books?

"A. I rely that, upon why the provision was
placed into the partnership, paragraph 12, which
ca,rries down * * * Indirectly, yes; I relied upon
that." (R. 132-133).
Later Terry testified to substantially the same
thing again :
"Dad told me that he was getting toward 65
or 70 years old -. along in years. I don't know
the exact age, he used the words, 'getting along
in years.' ·He has been doing some estate banking,
and that he thought he should have provision in
that partnership whereby upon his death there
would be an automatic distribution ·to me of part
of his capital contribution.
#

"I told him, as well a·s I can remember, maybe
not word-for-word, that I was not so worried
about wh~t w~uld happen if he died, as I was 1!-ot
.expecting him to drop dead, but I was worried
· 'what would happen after I quit school, and
changed my future plans, and when out to Mur-

10
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ray in a partnership, if for o~e reason or another,
it went belly-up, and was dissolved.
"He said, 'this was no problem. We can have
provisions in the partnership that will take care
of this also.'
"Q. That is the conversation upon which you
rely~ as speaking that intent.
"A.

That intent for drawing the original
partnership~ yes.
"Q. As I understand, when the original partnership articles were drawn, Mr. Wunderli
(should be Mr. Roberts), also your father, had
never said anything to you to indicate he did not
intend to get his money out.
"A. We never discussed it.
"Q. Never came up, or been a statement to
you of that kind, in that three-year period?
"A.

No sir." (R. 320.) (Emphasis added.)

During the discussion of the partnership agreement
Rulon stated that he wanted 5lfo back before distribu ..
tion of any profit on a 40-40-20 basis (R. 112) . Return
of capital to Rulon, or to any of the partners, was
never discussed with either Mr. Roberts, who drew the
agreement, or with Flora, the third partner ( R. 113) .
At the time of signing the articles, Terry went out of
the room with Flora and explained the benefits of the
contract to her, but he did not tell her she had a right
to share in Rulon's capital (R. 115).
Terry had a degree in accounting, and he managed
the partnership and kept all the books (R. 115). When

11
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'ferry needed money for the partnership business he
asked for it (R. 116), but he was careful never to ask
for money for operations. He says that his father never
mentioned notes (R. 117). When Terry obtained money
from Flora, on the other hand, it was by way of loans
which were paid back at 8 per cent interest (R. 119).
Terry, in setting up the books, understood that capital
accounts were meant to reflect "the monetary interest
a partner has in the business as of that day" (R. 120).
Prior to dissolution· of the partnership Terry didn't
regard ·himself as having any substantial monetary interest ( R. 120) except for about $1,000.00 paid in and
a credit he had made to his own capital account (R.
121). It was his practice to credit his salary to capital
if there were not enough profits to pay it, and he did
this without prior consultation with his partners (R.
121).

. As of the date the notice of dissolution was sent,
March 21, 1960, substantially all sums paid by Rulon
West to the partnership had been credited to Rulon's
capital account ( R. 128) , and it was not until June 15,
1960, that Terry made an entry transferring 60Cfo to
him and Flora (R. 129}. He refused to elect any
particular written or oral agreement as the basis for
his claimed right, taking the position that it came from
numerous conversations and writings over a period of
three or four years (R. 132-133).

12
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Flora E. West
Defendartt Flora E. West did not appear at the
trial, and portions of her deposition were read into the
record. She testified that the first thing she knew about
the partnership was when she was taken to Mr. Roberts'
office (R. 174-176). She signed the agreement after
reading it over and over ( R. 17 4-17 5) . She didn't discuss the provisions with Mr. Roberts, and there had
been no prior discussion of the terms with anyone. Her
understanding that she was to receive 207o of Rulon's
capital was based solely upon her interpretation of the
agreement (R. 180-181), because "where would I get
it?" (R. 181). No one obtained permission from her
to make additional investments in the partnership (R.
181). She hadn't thought much about distribution of
assets, but only about losses (R. 182). Rulon had never
told her that she and Terry were to get 607o of his
capital. He didn't talk to her about the partnership
(R. 183}. She didn't believe Rulon "gave contributions," but that he "put that investment in there" ( R.
179). Rulon told her he intended to put "all my income
from now on out" into the venture, and did-n 't hope to
see a dime of it while he was living ( R. 180) .

Donna Holmes
Donna Holmes is a daughter of Rulon and Flora
West. During the winter of 1959 Flora told her Rulon
wasn't losing anything in the motel venture because
his money was drawing interest, which was to come out

13
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II

before any profits (R. 184-185). At a family meeting
in February, 1960, attended by Terry, Rulon and some
of Rulon's daughters, the daughters were told that it
was to be understood that 'the motel was Dad's", that
the profit and loss was being divided 40-40-20, and that
Terry was "building the estate" of Rulon. Terry said
he had $3,000.00 in the venture, to which Rulon stated
that he thought it was only $1,500.00 (R. 186).

Betty Bills
Betty Bills, another daughter, was also at the
family meeting of February, 1960. At this meeting
Terry said all he had was a job and a right to 40<;'o of
the profit and loss; and that he was building his Dad's
estate (R. 189) .

Ruth Francis
Ruth Francis, another daughter (called by defendants) testified that Rulon told her in April, 1960,
that he and Terry had reached a settlement, and that
Rulon had then given Terry part of his inheritance
(R. 209-210), but that Terry was to buy Rulon out
(R. 257-258).

LeRoy E. Holmes
Le Roy E. Holmes, a son-in-law of Rulon and
Flora, testified that during the winter of 1959, Flora
West had told him that all the money Rulon put into
the partnership would be returned to him before she
would. receive anything substantial (R. 251).

14
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The testimony of all three partners and the scrivener,
establishes that there was never any discussion with
respect to Rulon's giving up the right to return of
capital. Terry's entire case depends upon conversion
of a general statement that he could be "protected"
into an agreement that he would receive 407o of Rulon's
capital regardless of whenever, however, and in what
amounts the contributions might thereafter be made.
The evidence does not support the view that Terry
and Flora believed what they now claim to have believed. The conduct of all three partners supports th~
construction claimed by Rulon.
Take Rulon's conduct when he talked to Mr.
Roberts. He told him that he wanted 57o return on
his money, which was about what he could get if he
"invested" it someplace else. Thereafter, on December
3, 1958 (as the trial court must have believed) Rulon
wrote to Terry that he wanted notes made up for
amounts previously advanced at Terry's request. In
a subsequent transaction with the First Security Bank
aimed at obtaining some additional financing, Terry
and Rulon both being present, Rulon submitted a financial statement showing the motel, El Rancho Enterprises, to be his asset, of a valueof $135,000.00 (R.
251-252; Exhibit 13). During this same time, which
was subsequent to the letter of December 3, 1958, the
partnership agreement was re-executed with the distribution of assets provision unchanged ( R. 303) .
Terry's conduct, on the other hand, is inconsistent
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with a present claim of ownership. He kept the books
of the partnership in which amounts contributed to
capital by him and his partners was credited to their
respective capital accounts, with knowledge that capital
accounts reflect the "monetary interests" of the various
partners (R. 120). His own financial statement for the
First Security Bank (Exhibit 12) did not show as an
asset any interest in El Rancho Enterprises. He continually asked his father for money for use in the partnership (R. 116) but between its inception in 1957 and
April2, 1960, neither he nor Rulon ever mentioned that
the capital paid in by Rulon was not to be returned
( R. 320) . Notwithstanding dissolution of the partnership on about March 21, 1960, the event upon which
Terry says his interest was to vest, -~e took no steps
to make a transfer on the books of the partnership
until June 15, 1960, after Rulon had left the country
(R. 184). Terry admitted making the statements at a
family meeting as related by his sisters, but explained
that he was only telling them "what I considered as
of that date my position in the El Rancho Enterprises
was" (R. 278). He admits that he told his sisters that
he had $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 and Rulon had $140,000.00 in the capital accounts. He also testified at one
point in the trial that he did recall telling his sisters
that all he had at El Rancho "was a job and 40%
interest in the profits" which was true at the time, that
is, in February 1960 (R. 135-136). After a night's
sleep, he changed his testimony (R. 278}.
Flora's only basis for an understanding about the
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meaning of the articles when she signed them was the
articles themselves. Her conduct thereafter indicates
that she did not believe that she had a right, present or
contingent, to receive Rulon's capital or any part of
it. It was her understanding that the "gift" made by
Rulon to Terry was made at Murray during the meeting
of April 2, 1960-not that she had always had a right
to a share of Rulon's capital account (R. 176).
The 1960 talk between the parties about gifts,
sharing capital accounts, and the desire of Rulon to
make some provision for distribution of his estate, all
occurred at about the time the parties were attempting
to settle their differences. Almost three years had passed
since the articles of partnership were entered into, and
although those negotiations might have a bearing upon
the interpretation and effect of the agreements of March
and April, 1960, their bearing upon what the parties
meant in September and October, 1957, is not discernable-except insofar as they seemed to be negotiating
about something Rulon owned.
Moreover, Terry's testimony was sprinkled with
half truths, inconsistencies and revisions throughout.
The statements he made at the family meeting are
clearly inconsistent with the position he takes now. In
his first-day testimony Terry swore that Rulon "in
terms" had said his capital would not have to be returned.
In later testimony he twice admits the scope of the discussion to have been that he could be "protected" in
event of dissolution. At the trial he swore that during
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discussions of the dissolution agreement he told Earl
Wunderli that there were "no liabilities to partners";
whereas in his deposition, in response to a direct question
about such a discussion he had said only that "they had
access to the books." Confronted with the inconsistency,
he said, with reference to such a discussion, "I didn't
say one way or the other, did I?" At the trial he swore
that the supplemental "gift" agreement was meant
to have operative effect, but on his deposition he had
sworn that it was obtained only for tax purposes. When
confronted with his deposition he swore that the "main
reason" was for tax purposes (R. 308-309).
As this court indicated in Wood v. Wood et al.,
87 Utah 394, 49 P.2d 416, 422, a court may in evaluating the testimony of the parties, consider "natural
behavior".
It is not natural behavior for a person to demand
5lfo interest on money while giving up return of the
principal. It is not natural for persons claiming substantial ownership of a partnership to conduct their
affairs as if they had no ownership. It is not natural
behavior for a son, when queri~d by his sisters about
being favored by his parent, to say all he has is a job
and an interest in 407o of the profits, when he in fact
claims an absolute right to receive 407o of his father's
capital.
Under the provisions of 48-1-15 Utah Code Annotated 1953, contributions of partners are to be returned
to them, "subject to any agreement." It is submitted
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I

I

that a partner who wants to avoid the effects of 48-1-15
bas the burden of showing an agreement that capital
shall not be returned. In the articles in this case, it may
be arguable that the $48,500.00 was being "donated"
to the partnership-and such a donation would be consistent with Terry's idea that he could be protected.
But subsequent contributions, according to paragraph
3 (b), are to be credited to the capital account of the
contributing partner. On the previous appeal this court
said that the contract was ambiguous with respect to
return of capital. The defendants have failed to produce
evidence of any circumstances or actual intent which
would show an agreement specific enough to overcome
the effect of 48-1-15.
Insofar as the findings fail to state what the actual
intent was, they fail to follow this court's prior directive;
and if they are construed as finding an actual intent
that Rulon's subsequent contributions need not be returned, they lack evidential support, and the judgment
should be reversed.

II
THE COURT'S FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT OF MARCH 31, 1960, WAS VALID AND
BINDING WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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In its decision ( R. 59-60) the trial court found
that the articles were "binding upon the parties" and
that the "intention of the parties to the articles as to
the meaning of the articles" required adjustments as
set out in the decision. r.rhere was no reference to the
dissolution agreement of March 3I, I960 (Exhibit 2).
Between the dates of the minute entry and preparation
of the findings and conclusions the dissolution agreement became an operative document.
Iri Finding of Fact ~o. 8 (R. 70) the court found
that the parties in executing the dissolution agreement
of March 3I, I960, did not intend that "liabilities to
partners'' should include the capital accounts of the
parties, nor did they intend that the phrase "liabilities
of the partnership" should include capital accounts of
the parties. There was no finding as to what they did
intend .
. And in Conclusions of LawN o. I (R. 7I) the court
held that all the parties were ''bound'' by the dissolution
agreement.
The court refused to find that the "supplemental
agreement" (Exhibit I6) (found by this court insufficient to constitute a gift) had operative effect, taking
the pqsition that it was unenforceable for lack of consideration. The express negative finding is not included
in the formal findings of fact, but may be implicit in
the fact that it is not mentioned in Conclusion of Law
No. I.
20
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The enforceability of the dissolution agreement
should be considered in the light of paragraph 16 of the
Articles of Partnership:
"Any decisions and major arrangements required or necessary in the operation of said busi . .
ness which are not in the ordinary course of
operations shall only be made and effected by
and with the unanimous agreement and consent
of all the partners."
The dissolution agreement is not "in the ordinary
course of operations" of the partnership, since it provides for dissolution, the selling of all partnership
property, and distribution of assets. It also in paragraph 2 contains provisions as to management of the
business pending winding up, and for participation of
an outside person, Le Roy E. Holmes, as sometime
agent of Rulon R. West.
Although the parties are in conflict as to the
meaning of the dissolution agreement, there is no substantial dispute as to the manner in which, and the times
at which, it was signed.
Terry testified· that the dissolution agreement was
a result of negotiations after a dispute (R. 122) . The
agreement hadn't been discussed with Flora E. West,
and she didn't see it or sign it until long after it was
signed by Rulon and Terry, at a time when Terry and
Rulon had found that they could not resolve their differences (R. 124). E. L. Schoenhals, who assisted in
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negotiation of the dissolution agreement, swore that he
had not discussed the matter with Flora (R. 340).
In written interrogatories served upon the defendant Flora West on June 14, 1961, and introduced at
the trial, the following question and answer are set
out:
"Q. If you signed, on what date or dates did
you sign a~reements (~earing date of April 2,
1960) relating to the dissolution of the partnership and distribution of assets? Where? Who
was present?

"A. Not sure, probably January, 1961, probably at my home in the presence of Terry West"
(R. 254).
It is thus clear that the dissolution agreement was
negotiated between Terry West and Rulon West without the concurrence or consent of one of the partners.
The agreement affected her rights, and could not bind
her unless she agreed to it. Inasmuch as the agreement
is not necessarily "beneficial" to her (if she really
believed herself already entitled to 207o of Rulon's
capital), her assent cannot be presumed. There is no
evidence that she ever agreed orally to the terms of the
dissolution agreement before she signed it.
By the time she signed, any offer by Rulon to her
to contract on such a basis would have expired. Not
only had a reasonable time elapsed, but circumstances
must have revoked the offer. When Flora signed it in
January, 1961, in the presence of Terry West, a dispute
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had developed between him and his father that could
not be resolved. The records of this case show that the
complaint was filed by Rulon West with the clerk of
the District Court on January 6, 1961, and it is fair
to infer that the agreement was not executed by Flora
West until after this action had been brought, and
that it was signed for the purpose of attempting to
obtain some advantage in the action. If Terry and Flora
rely upon the dissolution agreement, it is their obligation
to show that the elements of a valid contract, viz., offer,
acceptance, and consideration; and, the acceptance of
the offer must have been made while the offer was still
open.
The evidence establishes that the parties contemplated a written dissolution agreement. The situation
with respect to which they were contracting was one
in which a writing would be desired. The contract had
been drawn by the attorneys for Terry and Rulon and
set out a detailed plan of dissolution. In light of the
parties' prior disputes and problems, the only reasonable inference is that none was to be bound until the
dissolution agreement had been executed by all. As
said in Spinney v. Downing~ 108 Cal. 666, 41 Pac. 797:
"When it is a part of the understanding between the parties that the terms of their compact
are to be reduced to writing, and signed by the
parties, the assent to its terms must be evidenced
in the manner agreed upon, or it does not become
a binding obligation on either."
See also, I Corbin on Contracts_, §80, p. 104 et seq.;
23
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1 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) §28A; Hopkins v.
Paradise Heights Fruit Growers" Assn._, 58 Mont. 404
'
193 Pac. 389.

There was no finding with respect to intention to
be bound; but there is no evidence that Flora assented
to the dissolution agreement at or about the time it was
signed by Terry and Rulon. 'This being true, the dissolution agreement as signed by two of the partners is,
with respect to the third, only an offer to contractwhich could he accepted prior to its revocation, rejecttion, or expiration.
The offer was made ..,on or about April 2, 1960.
There is no evidence of any accepatnce by (indeed,
any communication to) Flora before January, 1961.
If no time is specified in the offer, it terminates after a
reasonable time; and what is reasonable depends in
part upon "circumstances of the case which the offeree
at the time of his acceptance either knows or has reason
to know." Restatement of Contracts_, §40; 1 Corbin on
Contracts_, §36; 1 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) §54.
Flora no longer had power to "accept" the offer by
signing Terry's carbon copy of the Dissolution Agreement (Exhibit 2). Nine months had passed, and Rulon
had brought an action against Terry and Flora for
dissolution and winding up of partnership affairs. She
must have known that all bets were off.
The Dissolution Agreement purports to be an
executory contract, and the provisions for distribution
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of assets to the various partners are conditional upon
Terry West taking steps to operate the properties for
the partners, sell the property and wind up partnership
affairs. The obligation to wind up and sell, so that
partnership property could be converted into a distributable assets, appears to be an essential part of the
agreement.
The agreement was signed by Rulon West on
March 31, 1960, and by Terry West, apparently a day
or two later. Yet the voluntary winding up of the
partnership affairs never occurred. As of January 6,
1961, when this action was initiated, the business was
being operated by Terry much as before, and no sale
of any substantial part of the partnership assets had
been made. Moreover, the findings of fact of the
special master, confirmed by the court (R. 34, 48),
establish that beginning in late March, 1960, and until
October 25, 1961, the defendants Terry West and Flora
West used a portion of the partnership property for
their own business; that they made a profit on it, and
that Rulon had to have court assistance to obtain his
rightful share.
Not only that, but Terry never did sell the partnership property and wind up partnership affairs. On
October 25, 1961, the District Court, after a hearing,
found that it was necessary to appoint a receiver to
do so (R. 29-32). The order appointing the receiver
was entered more than a year and a half after Rulon
and Terry had signed the dissolution agreement.

25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Because of the defend&nts' nonperformance, there
was a failure of consideration, and Rulon's obligations
under the Dissolution Agreement were excused. Restatement of Contracts_, §274; 3A Corbin on Contracts
§658; 6 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.), §814.
J

III
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT AMOUNTS
AWARDED TO DEFENDANTS WERE "BY
WAY OF GIFT" WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
"*** a promise, unsupported by a valid consideration, to make a gift does not constitute a
gift; nor can such a promise be enforced, even
though the promise be made in writing, and the
writing delivered to and accepted by the donee.

***
"A gift inter vivos to be valid must take effect
at once, and there must be nothing to be done
essential to the validity; for if it is to take effect
in the future, there is no gift, but only a promise
to give. So a gift to take effect at the death of the
donor is void ***" Thornton_, Gifts and Advancements (1893), §§ 74 and 76.
Until the findings were entered in the instant case,
the above statement from a venerated writer had been
almost unanimously accepted for decades as a correct
state1nent of the law. If Thornton is right, the finding
of "gift" must be set aside, even on the testimony of
the defendants themselves.
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the following excerpt Terry West is being
questioned by Rulon's counsel, using Terry's prior
deposition:
" 'Q. Now I show you Exhibit 3 (the Supplemental Agreement; Exhibit 16 in the present
appeal), Mr. West. You can read that over. It is
not signed, as you will see, and it is not dated;
however, is that substantially the agreement you
were telling us about? *** It was your understanding, was it, that this agreement was part of
this Exhibit 2?' (Exhibit 2 being the Dissolution
Agreement)

'A.

Yes.***

'Q. (reading from deposition) 'Why were
you so concerned about this gift business ; you
already owned it, didn't you? *** Your answer
then was this: 'A. The gift business, as far as
this Exhibit No. 3, was strictly to prevent Uncle
Sam from coming in for any taxes. As far as the
gift, it was already made and signed by my father
with Exhibit No. 2 and the original partnership.'

"A. Yes.
"Q. You would like to change your answer
to my next question, would you, earlier in the
examination today?

"A. What was the question?
"Q. I said to you the sole purpose of this
Supplemental Agreement was to meet an anticipated tax liability?
"A. I said no, partially. I couldn't answer
exactly one way or the other to that question.
The biggest reason I had that drawn was for tax
purposes, but that was not the only reason.
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''Q.

What was the other reason?

"A. So we knew exactly what was happening
out there, and supported the other three documents.
"Q. Now going to our examination at that
time, I asked you this question, do you recall:
(page 40, line 22) 'Q. You figured that a gift
was made by your father at the time he signed
the original partnership?' *** Your answer to
that was: 'A. No. The gift was promised if the
business was ever sold at the time of the original
partnership. And then when he made these other
documents, he verified that intent. And as far
as this, Exhibit No. 3 was signed just strictly for
income tax purposes.' ***
"Q. The next question was: 'Q. So your understanding at the time of the partnership agreement itself was that there was not any gift then,
but there (page 41) was a promise to make a
gift?'

"A. Yes.
"Q. And your answer: 'A.
ship was ever sold.'
"A.
"Q.

If the partner-

Yes.
And is that still your testimony?

"A.

That is still my testimonyn (R. 307·
309) . (Emphasis added.)

Flora's testimony at the trial is more skimpy than
Terry's, but of the same purport. She stated (R. 180)
that whether she received 207o depended upon the sale
of the motel. This is consistent with the averment in
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her answer to the complaint, filed early in the case. Her
third defense (R. 24) is as follows:
"On October 15_, 1957_, by the aforesaid partnership agreement, plaintiff made a gift to this
defendant of 20% of all of the contributions
made to said partnership by him_, whether at its
inception or thereafter and whether by ~ay of
capital contributions or by way of advances to
the partnership, and this defendant in acceptance
of. said gift materially altered and changed her
position and plaintiff is estopped and should not
now be heard to say that said gift is or can be
withdrawn, altered or modified." (Emphasis
added.)

Her position as well as Terry's, then, is that Rulon
made a gift not only of $48,500.00, which he contributed
to the partnership at the time the articles of partnership
were drawn, but at that same time he made or promised
a gift of all future contributions, no matter how much
they might be.
The theory of the trial court appeared to be that
the articles of October 15, 1957, constituted a gift of
the original contribution, and a promise to make a gift
of future contribution. The court seemed to think an
intention to make a gift was expressed in the partnership articles, from which he could presume a like intent
every time Terry requested and obtained money from
Rulon, regardless of the circumstances under which the
request was made.
There is no basis for such a presumption-particularly in light of the evidence of "intent" outlined above,
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and even if there were, the other essential elements
of an inter vivos gift have not been proved. 'fhe sutns
paid in by Rulon were not paid to the partners, but
were placed in Rulon's capital account, and continued
to be subject to some control by Rulon. There was no
assignment of a partnership interest as such. There was
no delivery of property to the claimed donees at any
time. The interest held by the partnership is not held
by the partners as such. Under the Utah Partnership
Act, a partner retains an interest in partnership property as a tenant in partnership, which interest is completely inconsistent with a completed inter vivos gift
of property. As said in JVood v. Wood et al.J 87 Utah
394, 49 P.2d 416, 418:
"Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the
future, and go into immediate and absolute effect,
and a gift of property to take effect at some
future date, or at the death of the donor is void.
Such a transaction amounts only to a promise
to make a gift in the future, and, being without
consideration, cannot be enforced."
A case nearly in point is Meyer v. Meyer,
106 Miss. 638, 64 So. 420, in which three sons
claimed that their father had given them a half interest
in his share of a partnership, by way of gift. The court
held that the father had not made a gift of the share,
but only an ineffectual promise to make a gift. In
commenting on the claim of the sons that a gift had
been made, the court said:
30
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"These sons of Jacob Meyer were each employes of the firm receiving salaries as such, and
this credit to them of a portion of their father's
interest in the profits of the business was not as
compensation for any services rendered. These
sons seem to have drawn each year out of the
business something more than the salaries paid
them though the amounts drawn in excess of
their salaries constituted only a small portion of
the profits credited to them. It does not appear
that they were authorized to withdraw the profits
credited to them, without the consent of the
members of the fir1n, nor does it appear that
either member had authority to withdraw profits
therefrom without the consent of the other. It is
hardly conceivable that the members of this firm
intended that their sons and daughters should
withdraw therefrom the profits credited to them,
for it is perfectly obvious that had they so done
the business would have been seriously crippled;
and, moreover, the amounts credited to them
were merely estimated and not ascertained
profits.
"These facts evidenced nothing more than a
promise on the part of Meyer to give to his sons
a portion of his interest in the profits of the business, which promise he never complied with by
withdrawing these profits from the business and
delivering them to his sons; consequently they
never became the owners thereof and their claim
thereto should not have been allowed."
The court held the gift ineffectual, notwithstanding
amounts had been credited to the sons-at the direction
of the father-on the partnership books.
The essential elements of gift include: (I) com-
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petent donor, (2) freedom of will of the donor, (3)
completion of the gift with nothing left undone, (4)
delivery of property by the donor and acceptance by
the donee, and ( 5) the gift must go into immediate and
absolute effect. Applying these requirements in Goggins
et al.~ v. Herndon/~ 73 Idaho 169, 249 P.2d 203, the
Idaho Supreme Court struck down a claimed gift, notwithstanding a document had been signed by the claimed
donor to the effect that the proceeds of any sale of
mining claims were to be "divided and shared equally
between the above named parties." The court held that
the agreement lacked three of the elements: That it be
complete and nothing left undone, that it be delivered
by the donee and accepted by the donee, and that it
go into immediate and absolute effect. In the present
case the claimed donees both admit that they were to
have a gift only if the business was sold.
The elements of gift must all be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Lovett v. The Continental
Bank and Trust Company~ 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d
1065; and "unless the intention to make a gift is expressed in writing or is clearly inferrable from the acts
or declarations of the alleged donor, there must always
be grave doubt" whether the transaction shall be considered a gift. Holman v. Deseret Savings BankJ 41
Utah 340, 124 Pac. 765.
Courts have sometimes found a presumption of
gift where property has been delivered by a parent
to a child, but there is no basis for such a finding where
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the property is delivered to the child in his capacity
as the manager of a partnership business, for use in
that business. It makes a difference that Terry occupied
a fiduciary position. As said by this court in Sharp v.
Sharp) 54 Utah 262, 180 Pac. 580:
"The relation of partners as between themselves is a fiduciary one, that of trustee and cestui
que trust."
Or, as said in Nelson v. MatschJ 38 Utah 122, 110
Pac. 865:
"One of the fundamental principles of the law
of partnership is that partners stand in a fiduciary relation to each other, and that it is the
duty of each partner to observe the utmost good
faith toward his co-partners in all dealings and
transactions that come within the scope of the
partnership business.''
Where such a fiduciary relationship exists there is a
presumption that a transfer from a father to a son,
in the context of a business relationship, is not a gift.
Ratliff v. Ratliff) 283 l{y. 418, 141 S.W. 2d
566, involved a claimed gift from father to son. The
father had been a successful businessman. He loaned
the son $1,200.00 for which the son gave a note, which
the father lost. The son and a witness testified that when
they went to pay off the note to the father, the father
gave the son a receipt signed by the father and refused
to take the money, "which amounted to a gift inter
vivos." The court refused to recognize the receipt as
delivery of a gift of a debt, saying:
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"Gifts inte_r vivos are closely scrutinized by
courts, especially where the donor and donee
occupy c_on~denti~l relations and it takes clear
an? convi~cin~ evidence to sustain them; *** The
evidence In this record is neither clear nor convincing that William Ratcliffe made a gift to his
son, Albert, of the balance due on this note by the
alleged e?'~cution of the receipt of August 30,
1932, reciting $1,200.00 was received from him
'for note in full.' There is nothing to connect
the note sued on with the note mentioned in the
receipt."
A related case is Gish v. St. Joseph Loan & Trust
Co.~ 66 Ind. App. 500, 113 N.E. 394. There the defendant-appellant was "a practicing physician and a
shrewd businessman of learning and ability * * * his
father believed him to be honest, and relied upon and
confided in him in the transaction of his business." The
son, acting as his father's manager in relation to certain
of his father's property, obtained substantial amounts
of property from his father. Before the father died,
he discovered that his son had managed the affairs of
his property in such a way that the son had obtained
substantial property from the father. The father
brought suit for the return of the property, but the son
refused, relying upon certain notes and instruments
which the father had signed. The court held that the
transfers to the son were invalid, saying:
"The burden is on the one who holds such
superior position to prove that he acted in per·
f ect good faith, gave to the other party full and
accurate information possessed by him, took no
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advantage of his knowledge, or his influence over
the other party, and that the transaction involved
was fair, well understood, and voluntarily carried
out by the person to whom he owed such duty.
*** ~less positive and unequivocal proof is required to establish the delivery of a gift from
parent to child than as between persons not so
related, and in cases where there is no suggestion
of fraud or undue influence very slight evidence
will suffice; but that rule does not apply to a
case where the child stands in a fiduciary relation
to the parent~ and htU access to and control over
his property.~***" (Emphasis added).
In Baer v. Baer, 109 Colo. 545, 12·8 P.2d 478, a
transfer from the mother to her son, alleged to have
been a gift, was held to be a loan. The son was his
mother's advisor in regard to some of her business
affairs. It was held that he had the burden of proving
that the transfer was a gift, the presumption being
it was not.
Terry's unconscionable behavior as a fiduciary consisted in asking his father for additional money for use
in partnership business, without disclosing that he intended to claim part ownership of the moneys obtained.
Rulon had a legal right to Terry's information-including his construction of the partnership articles. Cf.
Callister v. Callister) 15 Utah 2d 380, 393 P.2d 477;
see also, Normand v. Normand~ 89 Vt. 77, 94 Atl. 172;
Nobles v. Hutton~ 7 Cal. App. 14, 93 Pac. 289;
Naeseth v. Hommedal~ 109 Minn. 153. 123 N.W.
287; Barnard v. Gantz~ 140 N.Y. 249, 35 N.E. 430;
Morgan v. Owens~ 228 Ill. 598, 81 N.E. 1135; Com-
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stock v. Comstock~ 57 Barber (N.Y.) 458; Weitz v.
Moulden~ 109 Okl. 119, 234 Pac. 583; and Thaw v.
Thaw~ 27 F.2d 729, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit required of the fiduciary-donee
"candor and communication," and the "fairest and fullest explanation" to and with the persons so trusting.

Other cases dealing with the elements of gifts,
including the requisite delivery, are Johnson et al. v.
Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 160 P.2d 386; In re Hall's Estate~ 154 Cal. 527, 98 Pac. 269; Gardner v. Moore's
A.dm~r.~ 122 Va. 10, 94 S.E. 162; Gammon Theological
Seminary v. Robbins et al.~ 128 Ind. 85, 27 N.E. 341;
Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat et al.~ 85 W.Va.
750, 102 S.E. 726; Steber v. Combs et al.~ 121 W. Va.
509, 5. S.E. 2d 420.
_ A gift of the initial $48,500.00 paid into the partnership by Rulon West does not create as great a
difficulty because there was a delivery of property to
the partnership, and a writing relating to it, prior to
the time the fiduciary relationship came into existence.
But with respect to amounts of money subsequently
advanced to the partnership, there is no evidence at
all of any particular intent on the part of Rulon West
at the time of each advance; moreover, the evidence is
that Terry did not deal with his father with candor,
or give him a full explanation when additional funds
were requested.
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IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT.
The findings of fact as signed by the court violated
the direction of this court on the prior appeal that it
should take evidence ad make findings as to the intent
of the parties in executing the articles of partnership
and the dissolution agreement. The findings also violated the dictates of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, that the court shall find the facts specially.
The judgment ignored the existing provisions of another judgment entered on February 27, 1963, and
left it up to the receiver, or the court on the basis of
a future motion, to determine the effect of the findings
of fact, and the two judgments.
The manner in which the findings was drawn makes
it impossible to determine the court's theory in ordering
distribution in the way it did. It is impossible to tell
whether the findings were based upon the ''actual intent" of the parties, or a lack of evidence as to intent,
or upon a construction of the partnership articles. His
"findings of fact" are essentially conclusions as to
the construction to be placed upon the partnership
agreement.
The findings in this case are in such vague and
general terms that they do not meet the requirements
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previously laid down by this court. See Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison_, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284
'
to the effect that "the failure of the trial court to make
findings of fact on all rna terial issues is reversible error
where it is prejudicial." In the present case there were
material issues with respect to the actual intentions of
the parties in executing the articles of partnership and
the dissolution agreement; also, as to when, where and
how a gift was made. The finding that the amounts
being distributed to Terry and Flora were "by way of
gift" is totally inadequate to apprise either the plaintiff
or this court of the basis of the trial court's ruling.
In paragraph 3 of the plaintiff's motion to amend
the findings of fact there is a challenge to the finding
that Terry was entitled to salary that he was not able
to take because of the unavailability of funds (R. 77).
The finding allowing unpaid salary to Terry should
have been vacated on the ground that the partnership
agreement does not allow a credit if funds are not
sufficient to pay the salary. Paragraph 5 of the Articles
of Partnership contain the following provision:
"The said Terry R. West shall be Jhe manager
of the partnership business and shall be entitled
to draw up to but not exceeding the sum ~~
$500 per month for his services***" [Emphasis
added.]
The only evidence relating to actual intent on this
question is that of Paul S. Roberts, who drew the
partnership articles. His testimony was that the draw·
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ing account for Terry was to be $500.00 "provided
that there was enough profits to pay that" (R. 104) .

The form of judgment should have been amended
to make the provisions set out in paragraph 12 of the
plaintiff's motion to amend, since only in a form such
as that can the receiver make an accurate determination
of the amounts of money to be paid to the various
parties.

v
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
COSTS TO DEFENDANT.
c

The judgment (R. 74) provided that the defendants were to have their costs incurred in the action,
which is out of harmony with the provisions of Rule
54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is submitted
that in the instant case the plaintiff was the prevailing
party in the action as a whole. It was an action for
dissolution, winding up of partnership affairs, and
distribution of the assets. The dissolution was ordered,
the partnership was wound up at the instance and
request of the plaintiff, the assets being sold by a
receiver, and the assets distributed. Moreover, prior
to the trial of this action the defendants had taken the
position that the plaintiff was not entitled to return of
any of the amounts he had contributed to the partnership, except only 40% of the remaining assets after the
payment of non-partner creditors.
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In pointing this out, we recognize that the act.ion
of the trial court is probably not prejudicial error, since
a final judgment as to the manner of awarding cost is
to abide the final determination of the cause. It is
pointed out, however, so that this court can make a
determination and a direction to the trial court with
respect to costs.
As stated in the compiler's notes to Rule 54(d),
"it is intended, however, that the court will follow the
former practice, insofar as applicable in assessing costs"
-that is the practice based upon the prior statute that
costs would be awarded to the prevailing party as a
mtater of course. There is nothing in the record which
would justify deviation from that course in this case.

VI
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE COURT'S MINUTE ENTRY OF DECISION AND IN LARGE PART ARE NOT THE
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ·oF THE
COURT.
Although it is common practice for courts to have
counsel prepare findings of fact, this case points up the
problems that can be created when the trial court after
having arrived at a basis for its decision, permits counsel
to prepare findings of fact which are inconsistent with
the trial court's original theory, and are drawn with an
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eye to upholding the judgment at any cost, rather than
preserving an accurate record of the basis of the trial
court's judgment.
In this case the court in its minute entry of decision purported to be basing its findings upon a determination of the "meaning" of the articles of partnershipthough it did not make a finding with respect to actual
intent upon which the meaning was based. The findings
of fact as prepared by, counsel do not restrict themselves
to the basis of the trial court's minute entry of decision
but go off in all directions, finding the meaning of the
articles of partnership, generally; that a gift was made
somehow, sometime; the non-meaning of a dissolution
agreement; and, generally, that the parties are "bound
by" the dissolution agreement.
Although appellate courts have been reluctant to
reverse decisions of trial courts because of the delegation to counsel of preparation of findings of fact,
the practice has been criticized, and perhaps this is a
proper case for the court to place some restrictions upon
trial courts in this regard. The following statement
by Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia was quoted with approval
by the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. El Paso Natural Gas Company~ 876 U.S. 651, 12 L.
Ed. 12, 84 Sup. Ct. 1044:
"Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52
says the court shall prepare the findings. 'The
court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law.' We all know
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what has happened. Many courts simply decide
the case in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant
have him prepare the findings of fact and con~
elusions of law and sign them. This has been
denounced by every court of appeals save one
This is an abandonment of the duty and th~
trust t~at. has been plac~d in the judge by these
r?les. It IS a .non-compliance with Rule 52 ,spe·
cifically and It betrays the primary purpose of
Rule 52-the primary purpose being that the
preparation of these findings by the judge shall
assist in the adjudication of lawsuit * * *
''When these findings get to the courts of
appeal they won't be worth the paper they are
written on as far as assisting the court of appeals in determining wh)r the judge decided the
case."
See also Welch Company of California v. Strolee
of California~ Inc.~ 290 F.2d 509, in which the findings
of the trial court were set aside because a United States
Court of Appeals was wholly unable to determine how
the trial court reached its conclusions; and United
States v. Forness~ 125 F.2d 928, in which the late Judge
Jerome Frank set out cogent reasons for having a trial
judge prepare his own findings.
CONCLUSION
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as prepared by counsel and signed by the court are such
a hodge-podge of conclusions, and designed for so many
different purposes, that it is impossible to determine
the basis for the trial court's judgment. The trial court
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disregarded the direction of this court to make findings
of fact with respect to the actual intent of the parties
in executing the Articles of Partnership and the Dissolution Agreement. The end result was a court-imposed compromise based upon a theory not advanced
by any party, but moulded to almost-fit defendants'
theory.
But remand of the case for preparation of findings
by the trial court, unless he is instructed to prepare the
findings himself on the basis of the manner in which
he was impressed by the evidence, might serve no purpose since it could result only in addition findings being
prepared by counsel to suit his theory and uphold the
judgment. Upon examining the evidence, this court
can decide, here and now, that the plaintiff is entitled
to a decree which in effect returns to him the capital
contributions made to the partnership, (except perhaps
the initial $.48,500.00) , prior to distribution of any
assets to the defendants.
The defendants' continued insistence that they were
-----"~· promised a gift cannot now be construed as consideration. Consideration for a contract must be bargained
for as such, and defendants' attitude toward the transaction was that there wasn't any bargain - only the
promise of a gift.
.....;,;;;;,;;;~~

The gifts, even if promised, never were consum. mated, and it was ultimately necessary for the plaintiff
to obtain appointment of receiver for the purpose of
-~~selling the property and distributing the assets.
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Finally, it is clear that there was no intention 011
the part of Rulon to make a gift to Terry and Floracertainly no expressed intention on his part to donate
40lfo of all the contributions he might thereafter make
at the spectific request of Terry. Flora had no understanding of the transaction at all, except as gleaned
from the partnership articles and related to her by
Terry. Even Terry did not testify that Rulon promised
him 40<fo of such capital as he might thereafter put
into the partnership. He admits that the capital put in
by Rulon was to be credited to his capital account; and
the claim that Terry was entitled to share in Rulon's
capital comes entirely fro1n a self-serving assumption
based on a statement he says his father made that the
partnership articles might be so drawn that Terry could
be "protected" in event of dissolution.
The proof falls far short of that necessary to
establish an agreement that Rulon's capital would not
be returned to him. Therefore the provisions of 48-1-15
Utah Code Annotated 1953 must be applied and capital
should be repaid to the partners as provided in the
Utah Partnership Act.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
Fabian & Clendenin
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
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